The US Military Can’t Function Without China

The manufacture of modern weapons begins with complex materials, especially those containing rare earth elements. These elements are used to make everything from magnets and sensors to radars and lasers. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, an F-35 fighter requires more than 400 kilograms of rare earths to build; a destroyer and submarine, respectively, can require anywhere from two to five metric tons. Rare earths also appear in Tomahawk missiles, Predator drones, and the many missiles and bombs that have been used in Iran over the last few months. 

The problem for the U.S. military is that China accounts for roughly 70 percent of all rare earth mining and more than 90 percent of all rare earth processing, dominating entire categories of critical materials needed to make semiconductors, avionics, batteries, and things that go boom. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, China leads global production in 30 of 44 critical minerals while maintaining, in each of those 30 minerals, at least one monopoly in mining, refining, or processing.

Of the many components employed in modern military manufacturing, rare earth magnets are among the most important. Neodymium magnets are prized for being able to produce enormous magnetic forces relative to their low mass, making them invaluable for motors and guidance systems, where every bit of additional weight or electricity consumption can bring debilitating inefficiencies. Supplementing with other rare earths like dysprosium or terbium can make these magnets retain performance at high temperatures while adding samarium and cobalt can enhance stability under pressure, especially useful when flying things at high velocities. In 2025, China mined an estimated 270,000 metric tons of these elements out of a global total of 390,000 tons, accounting for roughly 69 percent of the world’s extraction. 

Samarium is probably one of the most important rare earths you have never heard of. It is a critical component used in everything from chemical manufacturing and cancer treatment to nuclear reactors and satellites – and Chinese companies essentially hold a monopoly on all of the world’s samarium processing. Following tariff tensions with Washington at the start of U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term in 2025, Beijing restricted samarium exports for military applications, forcing American weapons manufacturers to search for alternative sources. Most were unable to locate these alternatives. One highly publicized exception was the lucky acquisition of a long-forgotten cache in France, and that still resulted in processing expenses over five times that of the typical Chinese export.

Beyond rare earths, China controls the production of other critical minerals – like tungsten, which is also currently under Chinese export control. Its exceptional density, hardness, and heat resistance make it ideal for armor-piercing applications and radiation shielding, especially in nuclear submarines. Perhaps more importantly, tungsten is indispensable for making the basic cutting and drilling tools required throughout military fabrication: tools necessary to make everything from bullets and tanks to helicopters and battleships. China produces over 80 percent of the world’s tungsten. When Chinese exports of the element fell by almost 40 percent year on year after Beijing’s export controls took effect, prices skyrocketed amid the scarcity.

Following China’s initial export controls in April of 2025, the United States and European Union were quick to reach preliminary agreements to restart critical mineral exports. Trade tensions lingered, however, resulting in Beijing eventually extending export controls to other elements and even the sale of mineral processing equipment. Some of these controls were subsequently delayed, but the basic requirement for Chinese exporters to carefully vet foreign buyers and reject sales destined for military applications has largely remained in effect since 2025. That essentially shuts American weapons manufacturers out of direct access to Chinese rare earth materials and the high-tech products resulting from them.

Given that most manufacturers tend to have some raw materials on hand at any given time, there has been a noticeable lag between the market disruptions illustrated above and tangible adverse outcomes in production. Many of these downstream outcomes are just starting to be reported now, over a year after the export controls began. A recent batch of new F-35s, for example, was reportedly delivered without their AN/APG-85 radars, rendering the planes unusable in combat and only suitable for limited training exercises. Similar delays in the manufacture of combat-ready drones have also been reported, usually attributed to the spiking cost of samarium, which has been reported to be offered at prices up to 60 times the pre-control average. The shortage of even one critical rare earth component can render a $100 million machine essentially useless.

The United States’ recent conflict with Iran has added even more urgency to these supply chain issues. After five months of extensive aerial activity, the U.S. has reportedly expended “virtually all” of its available ATACMS and Precision Strike Missiles, along with roughly half of its Tomahawk cruise missiles, and substantial portions of its Patriot and THAAD interceptors. All of these require extensive quantities of rare earth components to replenish. In response, the Pentagon has pressured weapons manufacturers to accelerate production, signing agreements intended to triple production for Patriot components and quadruple it for THAAD. It remains to be seen, however, whether already-strained supply chains will be able to accommodate these desired surges in production.

Washington has, of course, not been oblivious to these rare earth supply problems. In July 2025, the Pentagon agreed to invest $400 million in MP Materials, operator of the only active rare earth mine in the United States. The investment package included a $150 million loan, a commitment to purchase output from a planned magnet factory, and price guarantees intended to help American producers compete with Chinese exports. A year later, the Pentagon announced a similar $25 million investment in ReElement Technologies to expand domestic processing of critical minerals, most notably gallium and germanium. 

Washington has also pursued partnerships with mineral-rich allies in an effort to diversify rare earth supply. In October of 2025, for example, the United States and Australia committed a combined $3 billion to critical mineral mining and processing projects, including measures intended to support alternative supply chains outside of China. The U.S. has likewise invested more than $70 million in Canadian mineral projects through the Defense Production Act, as part of its multinational Minerals Security Partnership launched in 2022.

Partnerships and money, of course, are only the first steps to getting new mines up and running. New mine construction in the U.S. typically takes an average of 29 years to complete, due to the extensive amounts of time required for surveying, permits, planning, and infrastructure expansion. Once a mine becomes operational, processing facilities are then needed to refine the extracted ores. These latter facilities need to be scaled appropriately to produce finished materials of consistent quality and in sufficient quantities at operational margins that can turn a profit even when put into competition with Chinese companies, many of which are now widely regarded as world leaders. Simply put, investments alone guarantee nothing, with any returns on investment potentially being realized only many, many years later, a common deterrent to the investment of commercial capital in these areas.

Finished rare earths, of course, do not automatically become magnetics and semiconductors either. With China being responsible for producing over 90 percent of the world’s rare earth magnets, it remains unclear how the U.S. military industrial complex will be able to produce or procure the high-tech components it needs at scale without Chinese exports, even if refined components were miraculously made available domestically in the short term. Appropriate financing and long-term investment would, again, be integral components to any solution but it remains unclear whether the United States even has the required technical expertise or sufficient numbers of skilled workers available to build and operate the many different facilities that would be required to mine, refine, process, and then actually build the magnets, alloys, and other products needed. 

How long American F-35s will continue to go without their radars is anybody’s guess.