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A criminal court in Vienna on August 5 refused Tajikistan’s request to extradite Shavkat Muhammad, a member of the banned National Alliance of Tajikistan, along with his 77-year-old mother, Sharofat Sharifova, and his brother Bilolidin Sharifov. Tajik authorities accuse the three of extremism; the family calls the prosecution political.
No written ruling has been published, and the account of the hearing comes from opposition figures who were in the room.
This is the fourth refusal to come out of a single Tajik submission. In April, the Interior Ministry sent Austria’s Justice Ministry files on 18 members of exiled opposition organizations, a dossier Leila Nazgul Seiitbek examined for the Diplomat in June. On June 24, a Vienna court took up the case of Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) member Firdavs Shukurov. The conduct Dushanbe cited in its own case materials was Shukurov holding an anti-Rahmon banner at an October 2021 demonstration in Vienna, partly documented in a YouTube video. The rally had been authorized and Shukurov held refugee status. Five days later the same court blocked the return of a 49-year-old woman wanted since 2018 for public calls to change the constitutional order.
Austria has not always drawn a firm line on these kinds of requests, and the difference appears to have been procedural. In March 2020 it removed Hizbullo Shovalizoda after rejecting his asylum claim, a migration decision rather than an extradition ruling. He was detained on arrival in Dushanbe and sentenced in June to 20 years for treason and participation in an extremist organization in a closed trial. An Austrian court later invalidated the removal, finding that the asylum decision had relied on outdated information about conditions in Tajikistan, and obliged Vienna to bring him back. He is still in prison.
Elsewhere in Europe, we see similar patterns in which there is a divide between extradition requests and migration violations, regardless of the reality on the other end in Tajikistan.
On June 20, Germany deported Asadullo Boboev, 54, and his 19-year-old son to Dushanbe. Boboev was placed in pretrial detention on arrival. A court in Geldern had authorized their pre-removal detention on the basis of expired residence status and repeated failure to leave voluntarily. Boboev had separately been given until July 1 to satisfy a German court that a criminal case awaited him, a deadline that passed while he was already in Tajik custody. His lawyer submitted dozens of pages documenting the risk of return, which the court disregarded, according to exiled opposition leader Sharofiddin Gadoev.
Human Rights Watch counts Boboev as the fourth documented Tajik opposition activist deported by Germany since 2023 and detained on landing. Abdullohi Shamsiddin, whose German case turned on a failure to register with the migration service, got seven years at home for liking a social media post; Bilol Qurbonaliev received ten and Dilmurod Ergashev eight. Poland deported Farrukh Ikromov in April 2024 after Germany returned him under the Dublin rules; family and opposition sources say a closed court gave him 23 years, a conviction Tajik authorities have never confirmed. Sweden returned Farhod Negmatov and his three underage daughters in December 2024. Negmatov was detained on landing.
The machinery behind these requests is outsized for a country of 10 million. Leaked Interpol records obtained by Disclose and the BBC placed Tajikistan third worldwide for red notices in circulation in late September 2024, ahead of China in seventh; Interpol publishes no such ranking. The Interior Ministry of Tajikistan said in July that 4,225 Tajik citizens are on the Interpol wanted list, 403 of them added since January, and that Russia handed over 373 in the first half of 2026. Neither figure is independently audited. Freedom House, which counts Tajikistan among the ten worst perpetrators of transnational repression, found that terrorism or extremism accusations appear in more than 46 percent of documented cases worldwide since 2014.
These two routes ask different questions. Extradition puts Dushanbe’s claims in front of a judge, and in Shukurov’s case the accusation amounted to a permitted protest. Removal puts the migrant’s own paperwork (or lack thereof) in front of a judge instead; the prohibition on returning anyone to a real risk of torture still binds, but it arrives as something the person facing deportation must establish, on a schedule the deportation sets, rather than as a case the requesting state has to make.
Dushanbe’s Austrian dossier has produced four refusals and no handovers; its German returns have required no dossier at all.
